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IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
V.

ROY D. TAYLOR,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
In its Appellee Brief, the State encourages this Court to undertake a mere
superficial analysis of the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure of Mr.
Roy Taylor and his vehicle on the 14th day of October, 2014. In the Lopez case,
the Utah Supreme Court was careful to assure that the constitutional protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment would remain securely in place, even after a
rejection of the "pretext stop" doctrine. In order to make this so, subsequent courts
are required to carefully consider 1) the justification and the reasonableness of the
initial stop, and 2) the duration and scope of the officer's subsequent conduct.
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The State encourages this Court to stop short of a complete analysis in three
separate instances. First, the State does not fully acknowledge that this Court
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness of the
search and seizure using a de novo standard. While the trial court's findings of
fact are reviewed using a "clearly erroneous" standard, the trial court's conclusions
of law regarding the reasonableness of the search and seizure, and ruling on the
Motion to Suppress, are reviewed "de novo" by this Court.
Second, the State encourages this Court to rule that the existence of a minor
traffic violation is sufficient to fully satisfy the required analysis as to the
"reasonableness" of the initial stop. The initial stop in this case does not pass the
"reasonableness" test, and a conclusive reference to an alleged minor traffic
violation does not adequately address the reasonableness standard.
Finally, the State asks this Court to find that the duration of the stop was not
unreasonably extended, even though there is compelling evidence and admissions
that the police far exceeded the scope of a simple traffic stop. However, the proper
analysis is not based solely on the duration of the stop as suggested by the State,
but rather on the reasons for the stop and whether those reasons were exceeded
The subsequent actions of the police impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop,
and a reference to the limited duration alone is not sufficient to insure the Fourth

2
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Amendment rights of Mr. Taylor were not violated. This is clearly not just a
~

traffic stop, but a stop where the stated plan was to search the car for drugs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

~

I.

In its brief, the State argues that the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review is the appropriate standard to apply in this case. However,
courts have repeatedly ruled that, although factual determinations by
the trial court can be reversed only by a showing of "clear error", the
legal conclusion of the justification for, and reasonableness of, the
stop is reviewed by an appellate court using the "de novo" standard.

II.

The State argues that, because the officer testified that he saw a minor
traffic violation committed by Mr. Taylor, the analysis concerning the
justification for the initial stop is complete. A mere showing of a
traffic offense is not, in and of itself, sufficient to conclusively
establish the "reasonableness" of the stop. For example, a minor
speeding violation does not routinely warrant a police response
involving the SWAT team. Thus, the mere occurrence of a minor
traffic violation is not sufficient to conclusively establish the
reasonableness of the initial stop. Additional analysis is required to
determine if, given the totality of the circumstances, the initial stop

3
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was reasonable. That common sense standard was clearly violated in
this case.
III.

The police conduct after the initial stop impermissibly expanded the
scope of the search and seizure well beyond the initial justification for
the stop. In its brief, the State focuses almost exclusively on the
"duration" of the stop and fails to fully address the "scope" analysis.
~

Even if the Court rules that the alleged traffic violation justified the
initial stop, the conduct of the police officers following the stop
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stated purpose for the stop.
ARGUMENT

Courts have repeatedly held that "[i]n determining whether an officer acted
reasonably during an investigative stop, we consider (1) whether 'the officer's
initial stop [was] justified' and (2) whether the officer's 'subsequent actions [were]
within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop." State v. Weaver, 169
P.3d 760, 763 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). "Because these elements are listed in the
conjunctive, failure on either element renders the seizure unreasonable." State v.
Morris, 214 P.3d 883, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (quoting United States v.
McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10 th Cir. 1994). Thus, the proper analysis of the
traffic stop in this case requires a complete examination of both the traffic stop
itself, and manner in which the traffic stop was effectuated. Further, this Court

4
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applies a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact,
~

but reviews, de novo, the legal conclusions and denial of the motion to suppress.

I.

The Court should review the trial court's findings of fact
under a "clearly erroneous" standard, and the conclusions
of law under a "de novo" standard.

It is well established that the Court of Appeals is required to review a trial
court's findings of fact using a "clearly erroneous" standard, and the State so
argues in its brief.

However, the "clearly erroneous" standard is not the only

standard of review that must be applied in this case. Courts have repeatedly held
Li)

that a court of appeals reviews de novo the ultimate determination of
reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. "When
~

reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court
disturbs the district court's findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous"

~

but "reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness." State v.

Duhaime, 258 P.3d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Baker, 229
P.3d 650 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). When reviewing an order granting or denying a
motion to suppress, an appeals court reviews the district court's decision de novo,
to determine if the search and seizure were reasonable. See United States v. De La

Cruz, 703 F.3d 1193, 1196-97 (10 th Cir. 2013). "Furthermore, we give no
deference to the trial court's 'application of law to the underlying factual findings

5
~
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in search and seizure cases."' Duhaime, 258 P.3d at 653. (quoting State v. Brake,
103 P.3d 699 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
Thus, this Court should apply the "clearly erroneous" standard when
reviewing the findings of fact, and review the conclusions of law "de novo."

II. The Initial Traffic Stop was "unreasonable" and therefore illegal.
In its brief, the State essentially argues that because the officer testified that
a traffic violation occurred in his presence, the analysis of whether the stop was
'justified" is complete. However, the alleged witnessing of a traffic violation is
only part of the analysis.

This Court should examine all of the circumstances

surrounding the stop, and make an independent determination as to the
"reasonableness" of the stop. De La Cruz, at 1196, 1197. "Within the confines of
an otherwise lawful stop, 'the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness."' State v. Simons, 296 P.3d 721, 731 (Utah 2013) (quoting Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). See also,
State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 63 (Utah 2008). Even if this Court assumes the facts
presented to the trial court to be true, a careful examination of all events leading up
to the traffic stop clearly demonstrate that this traffic stop does not meet the
"reasonable" standard required by the Fourth Amendment.
The officer who initiated the traffic stop was Detective Paul Scott, an
undercover detective, assigned to narcotics. R3 l 3 :4, 11-12.
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Detective Scott had received an apparently uncorroborated tip indicating that
~

the car driven by Mr. Taylor might be involved in illegal drug activity. R313 :4, 1112

~

Detective Scott saw a vehicle that matched the description allegedly given
by the anonymous informant. R313: 12
Detective Scott followed Mr. Taylor's vehicle for some time before
initiating the stop. R313:4, 317:21.
Detective Scott followed the vehicle, not because he immediately saw a

~

traffic offense, but because he determined that the vehicle was the one described in
the anonymous tip. R313 :4; 317 :21.
Detective Scott testified that he eventually saw Mr. Taylor's vehicle, which
was in front of him, following too closely to the vehicle in front of that. R313:5,
R31 7 :21-23. In other words, the officer concluded that the suspect vehicle some
distance in front of his police car was less than two seconds behind the car ahead
of that, which had to have been two vehicles in front of the police car.
In the preliminary hearing, Detective Scott freely admitted that the traffic
stop was a pretext to search the vehicle. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 21)
Within seconds or a few minutes, two other police vehicles, including
another undercover narcotics vehicle, appeared on the scene of this allegedly
routine traffic stop. R313:29.

7
~
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Detective Scott asked Mr. Taylor to step out of the vehicle and stand in front
of the undercover police vehicle. R313:5; 317:22.
While Detective Scott was going through the motions of a routine traffic
stop, Officer Russell commenced with the real purpose of the stop. He started
questioning Mr. Taylor about possible involvement with illegal drugs. R313:29-30.
Detective Scott asked Mr. Taylor to empty his pockets on the hood of the
police vehicle. R313:313:25; R317:24.
Even if this Court assumes the facts stated above are true, the Court must
still "review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, United States v. Prince,
593 F .3d 1178, 1184 (10 th Cir. 2010), including 'the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."' United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d
1240, 1243 (10 th Cir. 2001).
The officers' explanation of this incident simply fails the reasonableness
test. "[T]he 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,"' which "is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." State
v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 657 (Utah 2010) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,

39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996).
Consider that there was no evidence provided to the trial court that any other
traffic citations were issued, despite the Detective's testimony that he was "running
traffic" that evening. It also seems odd that the narcotics detective would be
8
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~

"running traffic", and that he would do so in an undercover narcotics vehicle.
~

Further, it is also unreasonable to conclude that, in a relatively small town like
Heber City, two other police cars, including another unmarked, undercover
narcotics vehicle, just happened to be close enough to respond, allegedly without
any pre-planning, to the routine traffic stop within one or two minutes. Finally, it
just does not make any sense to assume that all these officers, including two
undercover officers who carefully guard their anonymity, would show up for a
minor traffic stop with such overwhelming force.
Detective Scott did not just stumble upon this traffic stop. The testimony
provided to the trial court indicates that this "traffic" stop was pre-planned, and
executed in a manner that would allow the officers to expand the scope of the stop
beyond a simple "following too close" violation.

~

III. The actions of the police following the initial stop impermissibly
expanded the scope of the traffic stop.
The second part of the analysis of the legality of an investigative stop
concerns the manner in which the traffic stop was carried out. The State argues
that because the subsequent actions of other officers did not prolong the duration of

~

the stop, that again, the analysis is complete. Once again, this only takes into
account a portion of the required analysis. Even if, after a de novo review, this
Court determines that the trial court properly concluded that the alleged traffic stop
was justified, it is necessary to then focus the analysis on whether the officers
9
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subsequent actions exceeded the scope of the initial detention. In this case, the
officers were careful not to extend the duration, but they clearly and intentionally

4tl

expanded the scope well beyond the stated justification for the initial traffic stop.
Appellate courts have repeatedly held that the police can't have it both ways.
If they rely on an alleged traffic violation to justify the initial stop, then all the
subsequent actions of the officers must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the
traffic stop unless additional probable cause provides justification for expanding
the stop. "Both the 'length and [the] scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to
and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."'
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,

763 (Utah 1991). See also, State v. Hansen, 17 P.3d 1135 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
"An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification." "Vasquez v. Lewis, 2016 WL 4436144, _

~

F.3d __

(10 th Cir. 2016). "Even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." State v.
Gettling, 229 P.3d 647, 649 (Utah 2010).

While Detective Scott occupied Mr. Taylor with an allegedly routine traffic
stop for a minor infraction, Officer Russell, and others, came in and impermissibly
expanded the scope of the investigatory stop. Thus, the method used by multiple
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

0J

officers to stop, interrogate, seize and search in this case simply cannot be "strictly
~

tied to and justified by" the traffic stop for following too closely.
Here, the alleged traffic violation was following too closely, a violation of
Utah Code Section 41-6a-711, which requires a "two second" distance between
vehicles.
Using an undercover narcotics officer to effectuate the traffic stop was not
"strictly tied to and justified by" the nature of the stop.
An additional undercover narcotics vehicle arriving on the scene within a
minute or two was not "strictly tied to and justified by" the nature of the stop.
A third police vehicle also arriving at the scene within that same short time
frame was not "strictly tied to and justified by" the nature of the stop.
Requiring that Mr. Taylor stand in front of the undercover police car while
the license and registration were called in was not "strictly tied to and justified by"
the nature of the stop. There was no indication at the time of drug use, or anything
else that justified getting Mr. Taylor out of the car.
Requiring Mr. Taylor to "turn out his pockets" on the hood of the police
vehicle was not "strictly tied to and justified by" the nature of the stop. If the
officer had a legitimate concern for his safety, he is allowed to conduct a Terry
frisk for weapons unless he has developed additional probable cause. Requiring
Mr. Taylor to tum out his pockets was far beyond a safety issue.

11
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Requesting consent to search Mr. Taylor's vehicle was obviously not
"strictly tied to and justified by" the nature of the stop.
The alleged traffic violation that the police used to justify the initial stop
simply does not support the subsequent conduct of the police officers. The Utah
Supreme Court clearly stated that "inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions
unrelated to the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the
scope of the circumstances that rendered it permissible." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1135 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). This Court has reiterated that
limitation. "Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." State v.

Hansen, 17 P.3d 1135, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1132). See also United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812,816 (10 th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a defendant was unreasonably seized under the Fourth Amendment
when the officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons
that justified the initial traffic stop.) In rejecting the pretext stop doctrine, the

Lopez Court assured that "[t]hus, existing Fourth Amendment law precludes an
officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate a
suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion." Lopez, at 1135 (emphasis added).

12
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Taylor's vehicle was stopped because the officer wanted to search for
drugs. The officer admitted that was his express purpose. He freely acknowledged
that the alleged traffic violation was a pretext. There is no need to wonder about
his subjective state of mind. Two other police vehicles, including another
undercover vehicle, arrived on the scene of this traffic stop within seconds or a few
short minutes. Multiple officers exited their vehicles, and while Detective Scott
dutifully carried out the requirements of the purported traffic stop, the other
officers commenced their investigative questioning regarding possible illegal
drugs, which was the real purpose of the stop.
"There is no bright-line rule to determine whether the scope of police
conduct was reasonably related to the goals of the stop; rather our evaluation is
(@

guided by common sense and ordinary human experience." United States v.

Albert, 597 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10 th Cir. 2009). "Common sense" and "ordinary
human experience" indicates that the entire traffic stop was a planned drug bust.
The only way to insure the protection promised by the Lopez decision is to strictly
enforce limitations on the scope of police actions involving a traffic stop. Mr.
Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and the trial court should have
granted the motion to suppress.
~
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Respectfully Submitted,

this 2-3&;:f.. of September, 2016.

~~

RB!NB.GORDON

DANH. MATTHEWS
Attorneys for Roy D. Taylor

~
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